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Abstract
In this paper, we study optimal educational policies when the ability to benefit from
education is private information. We extend the framework of De Fraja (2002) in two
directions. First, we replace his unusual specification of the government’s budget constraint, which prevents the government to use tax revenues from an older generation to
subsidize the education of a younger generation, by the usual one. We show that the optimal educational policies achieve the first-best, are not regressive, and can be decentralized
through Pigouvian taxes and credit provision. Second, we consider utility functions that
are not quasi-linear. In this case, we show that the first-best can no longer be reached,
education may not be monotonic in ability and progressivities of education are locally
welfare improving.
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Introduction

The role of educational policies in the equalization of opportunities is a widely accepted issue
in political debates. However, a remarkable feature of most educational systems in the world
is the huge regressivity of spending per students.1 Economists have usually argued that
reducing the existing regressivity of education would result in significant welfare gains.2
The trade-off between efficiency and equity plays a fundamental role in the analysis of
optimal tax policies. In the specific case of education, this issue was originally addressed
∗
We wish to thank Luis Henrique Braido, Carlos E. da Costa, Daniel Ferreira, Andrew Horowitz, Rodrigo Soares, Thierry Verdier, and specially Antoine Bommier, Pierre Dubois, and James Poterba for helpful
comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank seminar participants at Getulio Vargas Foundation,
UFRJ, Toulouse, the 2004 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, the 2004 Meeting of
the European Economic Association, and the 2003 Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society. As usual,
all remaining errors are ours.
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1
See, for example, Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Kozol (1991) or Psacharopoulus (1986).
2
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) argue that the welfare gains from the equalization of spending across
districts in American states are about 3.2 percent of steady-state income.
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by Hare and Ulph (1979), who introduced schooling in Mirrlees’ (1971) original model and
assumed that the ability to benefit from it was only partially observable by the government.3
Fleurbaey et al. (2002) extended the Hare and Ulph model to the case where the ability to
benefit from education is unobservable and the government has a Rawlsian welfare function.
In a recent contribution, De Fraja (2002), hereafter DF, studied the optimal educational
provision in an overlapping-generations model in the presence of externalities and imperfect
capital markets. His surprising results suggest that educational policies: (i) should be regressive (in the sense that households with brighter children and higher incomes contribute less in
absolute terms than those with less bright children and lower incomes), (ii) should not provide equality of opportunities in education (in the sense of the irrelevance of the household’s
income to the education received by a child), and (iii) should be input-regressive (meaning
that education should be increasing in ability). Therefore, the regressivity of educational
systems in most countries may actually reflect the optimality of such policies, and attempts
to provide an equality of opportunities in education may generate large efficiency losses.4
In this paper, we show that the results obtained by DF critically rely on two specific
assumptions which are hard to justify and are not common in the taxation literature: (a) a
nonstandard government budget constraint and (b) quasi-linear utility functions combined
with a utilitarian welfare function.
The regressivity of the financing mechanism and the inequality of opportunities (results i
and ii mentioned above) are caused by a nonstandard restriction on the government’s budget
constraint: It is assumed that deferred payments made by the older generation cannot be
used to finance the education of the younger generation. However, the cross-subsidization of
education is one important feature of public educational systems. Moreover, this restriction
on the budget constraint generates a welfare loss. Hence, there seems to be neither positive
nor normative justifications for this assumption.
When we allow the government to finance education using deferred payments from the
older generation in the DF framework, the optimal educational policy takes a very different
form: it achieves first-best welfare (the maximum amount of welfare that could be reached
under perfect information) and provides equality of opportunities in education. Moreover, it
can be implemented in a decentralized way through a competitive equilibrium with Pigouvian
taxes and the provision of credit.
In the decentralized mechanism, first-best welfare is reached through a subsidy on education to correct the externalities, a lump-sum tax proportional to the average education
and the provision of credit (at the market interest rate). Such a mechanism is not regressive (i.e., wealthier households do not contribute less than poorer households and households
with brighter children contribute more than those with less bright children) and can also be
implemented in an environment where household’s wealth is unobservable.
Unlike argued by DF, the reason for the regressivity and the inequality of opportunities
of the second-best policy is not the trade-off between efficiency and equity but one between
efficiency and rent-extraction. Since the utility function is quasi-linear and the government
3

More specifically, they assumed that although the government could not condition financial contributions
on the ability to benefit from education, it could use this information for allocational purposes.
4
According to DF: “The regressivity of the optimal education system derived in the paper can be interpreted
as implying that pursuing redistributive goals using education policies is bound to have a substaintial cost in
terms of the sub-optimality of the education policy implemented: the fundamental message of the paper is
that there is a stark conflict between equity and efficiency in education.”
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has a utilitarianist welfare function, there is no preference for redistribution and the government simply minimizes deadweight loss.5 The need to use education in order to extract rents
arises simply due to the unusual restriction that prevents the use of revenues from deferred
payments to finance education. Then, since poorer individuals are those who benefit most
from education, minimizing deadweight loss implies that the education of poorer individuals
should be taxed more.6
Since the utility function is assumed to be linear in the wealth left to the next generation,
the optimal policy generates a large inequality of the future generation’s wealth and no
inequality of consumption. However, it seems counter-intuitive that a society who cares
about the redistribution in the current period would not care at all about inequality of the
wealth of the future generation.
We show that when the utility functions are strictly concave in the wealth of the future
generation, input-regressive policies may no longer be incentive-compatible. Moreover, the
trade-off between inefficiency and equity prevents the first-best welfare from being achievable.
The non-implementability of input-regressive policies result is fairly general as it does
not depend on the specific welfare function considered. Hence, it applies not only to the
DF model, but also to Rawlsian welfare functions as considered by Fleurbaey et al. (2002).
Therefore, our model suggests that, unlike in the models of DF and Fleurbaey et al., it may
be the case that education cannot be increasing in ability and an attempt to implement a
monotonic educational policy may instead lead to welfare losses.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework. Subsection 2.1 discusses the government’s budget constraint and 2.2 defines the competitive equilibrium without government intervention. Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 define the
government-intervention solution when the ability to benefit from education is and is not
observable, respectively. Section 3 characterizes the solutions when the utility function is
quasi-linear and Section 4 considers the case where the utility function is strictly concave.
Then, Section 5 summarizes the main results of the paper.

2

General Framework

We consider an overlapping generations model where individuals live for 2 periods. In the
first period, the individual receives an education and a bequest. In the second period, she
works, has a child, consumes, and provides an education and a bequest for her child. Each
household consists of a parent and a child. There is a continuum of households with measure
normalized to 1 in each period. As we will focus on steady-state equilibria, time subscripts
will be omitted.
Each individual’s utility function is
U = u(c) + v (x) ,
5

Provided that the aggregate income is such that it is socially optimal for someone to leave positive bequests.
The assumption of positive education externalities implies that the uniform commodity taxation result
does not apply and it is optimal to tax education and consumption at different rates even though the utility
function is separable.
7
The technical reason for the possible non-implementability of input-regressive policies is that the singlecrossing condition may not hold when the utility function in strictly concave. Both Fleurbaey at al. and DF
assume quasi-linear utility functions, which ensures that the single-crossing condition is satisfied.
6
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where c is her consumption, x is the amount of monetary resources available to the child, and
u and v are strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable functions, and limc→0 u0 (c) =
+∞.8 Section 3 considers the case where v is linear whereas Section 4 considers the case
where v is strictly concave.
There are two ways of transferring wealth to a child: bequests t and higher future wages
(through education e). The rate of return of bequests is normalized to 1. Education is transformed in future wages through a production technology y (θ, e; E), where e is the amount of
education, θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] is each child’s ability to benefit from education, and E is the general
level of education.9 We assume that θ is continuously distributed on [θ0 , θ1 ] with a strictly
positive density φ (θ) .
Substituting the two possible ways of transferring wealth to a child, we obtain
x = y (θ, e; E) + t.

(1)

The mother’s wealth, denoted by Y , is itself a function the amount of education she
received in her childhood. Let Γ ⊂ R+ be the space of possible wealth levels. Let h (Y, ẽ)
denote the probability function of Y given the educational profile of the previous generation
ẽ. We consider the optimal educational policies for the current generation taking as fixed the
amount of education of the previous generation. Therefore, we omit the term ẽ for notational
convenience.
Let k be the monetary cost of a unit of education. We assume that public and private
schools provide education at the same cost implying that the actual provider of education is
immaterial. Hence, we abstract from the discussion on whether education should be privately
or publicly provided. The household’s budget constraint is
Y = c + ke + t.

(2)

We assume that the production technology y : [θ0 , θ1 ]×R2+ → R+ is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions lime→0 ye (θ, e; E) = +∞ and lime→+∞ ye (θ, e; E) =
0.10 Furthermore, it satisfies the following conditions:
ye (θ, e; E) > 0

(A1) ,

yee (θ, e; E) < 0

(A2) ,

yeθ (θ, e; E) > 0

(A4) ,

yE (θ, e; E) ≥ 0

(A5) ,

yθ (θ, 0; E) > 0

(A3) ,

lim yE (θ, e; E) < k

e→∞

(A6) .

Assumptions (A1) and (A2) state that education increases wages in a decreasing rate. Assumption (A3) states that wages are increasing in the ability to benefit from education θ.
Assumption (A4) means that the marginal returns to education increases in the individual
ability. Assumption (A5) states that education may be a source of positive externalities.
Assumption (A6) , which states that the externalities are not large enough to exceed the cost
of education as the amount of education approaches infinity, is useful to ensure the existence
of a solution.
8

The dependence of the parent’s utility function on the child’s wealth rather than on her utility is an usual
assumption and greatly simplifies the analysis.
9
Notice that in the model presented, it is immaterial if education serves only as a screening device or
whether it enhances productivity.
10
The Inada conditions are helpful for establishing the existence of equilibria.

4

For notational convenience, define the expectations operator Ē [·] as
Z

θ1

Z

Ē [x] ≡

x (θ, Y ) φ (θ) h (Y ) dθdY.
θ0

Y ∈Γ

The general level of education is defined as the sum of every individual’s education:11
E = Ē [e] .

2.1

(3)

The Government’s Budget Constraint

Following DF, we assume that the government can offer a tax schedule and an education
schedule. A tax schedule consists of an income tax τ (Y ). An education schedule consists
of an offer of education e (θ, Y ), an up-front fee f (θ, Y ) and a deferred payment m (θ, Y ).
Since f (θ, Y ) and m (θ, Y ) may be positive or negative, the government is able to offer
student loans. The parent’s wealth Y is observable but the daughter’s ability to benefit from
education θ is private information.
With no loss of generality, each household’s bequests can be normalized to zero. In that
case, all bequests are left through up-front fees and deferred payments. The household’s
budget constraint is
Y = c (θ, Y ) + τ (Y ) + f (θ, Y ) .
(4)
In each period a parent with wealth Y and whose child has ability θ pays τ (Y ) + f (θ, Y )
as up-front taxes and m (θ, Y ) as deferred payments (due to the education received in her
childhood) and receives ke (θ, Y ) as education subsidies. In DF, it is imposed that the government is unable to use revenues from deferred payments to finance education. Hence, the
government budget constraint is
Ē [τ + f ] ≥ Ē [ke] ,
Ē [m] ≥ 0,
where the first equation states that the total amount of income taxes and up-front fees are
used to finance education while the second equation states that the total amount of deferred
payments is non-negative.
As deferred payments and education are the only channels of transferring wealth between generations (since bequests have been normalized to zero), imposing that the aggregate amount of deferred payments be non-negative is equivalent to restricting all transfers
between generations to be done through the provision of education. However, contributions
for public education account for a substantial amount of intergenerational transfers. For
example, Bommier et al. (2004) have shown that when expenditures in public education are
included in generational accounts along with pensions and health care, generations usually
thought to have benefitted from intergenerational transfers were actually net losers.
The only justification provided for such specification is given in footnote 11:
11

This specification implies that any unit of education generates the same externality (i.e., the externality of
a year in high school is the same as a year preparing for the PhD). However, it is straightforward to generalize
our results to the case where E = Ē [g (e)] ,for a strictly increasing function g : R+ → R+ .
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”Of course future taxes could also be used to repay the debt, but this would
reduce the amount available for the education of future generations, and must
therefore be subject to a limit, normalized here to 0; this value is consistent
with a steady state analysis, where the taxes levied on the future generation
must correspond to those levied on the current generation to pay for the previous
generation’s education.”
This argument does not explain why the government would not be able to use revenues
from deferred payments to finance education (or consumption) since, in each period, all taxes
are paid by the same generation (namely, by the parents). Hence the assumption that the
budget constraint is balanced with each generation in each period is also consistent with
a steady state analysis. Moreover, since the latter is the usual assumption in overlappinggeneration models, is weaker than DF’s specification, and is consistent with the evidence on
the importance of intergenerational transfers for public education, it does not seem reasonable
to further restrict the government’s problem.12
We will allow the government to finance education through deferred payments. Therefore,
the government’s budget constraint is
Ē [τ + f + m] ≥ Ē [ke] .

(5)

Equation (5) states that the net tax revenue is enough to finance the educational expenditures
in each period.
Subsections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 define the equilibrium without government intervention, the
first-best problem and the second-best problem, respectively.

2.2

The Equilibrium without Government Intervention

It is usually argued that investment in human capital is risky, nondiversifiable, and hard
to collateralize, implying that private credit markets may fail to finance education. In this
economy, credit markets are imperfect in the sense that individuals cannot leave negative
bequests: t ≥ 0.
The parent’s program is
max u(c) + v (y (θ, e; E) + t)
c,e,t

subject to c = Y − ke − t,

(6)

t ≥ 0.

A competitive equilibrium without government intervention is a profile of consumption,
education, and bequests {c (θ, Y ) , e (θ, Y ) , t (θ, Y ) ; θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} such that: (i)
c (θ, Y ) , e (θ, Y ) , t (θ, Y ) solve Program (6) for all θ, Y , and (ii) E = Ē [e] .
12

Furthermore, the choice of 0 for the limit of deferred payments allowed to be spent in education is not
just a normalization. As will be clear in Section 2.4, the first-best is obtained even under the unusual budget
constraint specified by DF if this limit is lower than the total cost of first-best expenditures on education
minus the first-best amount of income taxes.
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2.3

The First-Best Problem

As in most public-finance literature, we take a utilitarian government. Moreover, we assume
that the utility of future generations enter the welfare function only through the weight
attributed to it by the current generation.
As usual, we will refer to the outcome chosen by the government if ability were observable
as a first-best solution. A first-best solution is a profile of consumption, education, and
bequests {c (θ, Y ) , e (θ, Y ) , t (θ, Y ) ; θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} that maximizes the sum of each
parent’s utilities subject to the resource constraint and the definition of the general level of
education:
max
Ē [u (c) + v (y (θ, e; E) + t)]
{c(θ,Y ),e(θ,Y ),t(θ,Y ),E}

subject to Ē [Y − c − ke − t] ≥ 0

2.4

and

(3).

The Second-Best Problem

When the government cannot observe each individual’s ability to benefit from education, it
has to design an educational system that induces people to self-select. From the revelation
principle, the search for an optimal educational system can be restricted to the class of
mechanisms that satisfy the following incentive-compatibility constraint:
θ ∈ arg max u(Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ̂, Y )) + v(y(θ, e(θ̂, Y ); E) − m(θ̂, Y )),

(7)

θ̂∈[θ0 ,θ1 ]

for all θ, θ̂, Y.
Following DF, we assume that individuals are not forbidden to purchase education in the
private sector. Hence, they will only join the education program when their utility exceeds
the utility obtained if they purchase education privately:
u(Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y )) + v(y(θ, e(θ, Y ); E) − m(θ, Y )) ≥ P (θ, Y − τ (Y ) , E) ,

(8)

for all θ, Y, where
P (θ, Y, E) ≡ max u (Y − t − ke) + v (y (θ, e; E) + t) .
e,t≥0

A second-best solution is a profile of education and taxes {τ (Y ) , f (θ, Y ) , m (θ, Y ) , e (θ, Y ) ; θ ∈
[θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} solving
max

{e,τ ,f,m,E}

Ē [u (Y − τ − f ) + v (y (θ, e; E) − m)]

subject to

(3),

(5) ,

(7),

and

(8).

In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze the cases of quasi-linear and concave utilities separately.

3

Quasi-linear Utility

This Section considers essentially the same economy studied at DF. The only difference is the
government budget constraint (5), which allows the government to finance education through
7

deferred payments. However, as we will show in Subsections 3.2 and 3.3, the optimal policy
is drastically different under our budget constraint. The first-best can be implemented with
a simple mechanism that does not require the government to observe ability or income.
We assume that the utility function is quasi-linear:
v (x) = x

and u00 (c) < 0.

Furthermore, we assume that
u0 (c∗ ) = 1 for some c∗ ∈ R.
Note that c∗ is the amount of consumption whose marginal utility is equal to the marginal
utility of leaving resources to one’s child.

3.1

The First-Best Solution

The social marginal benefit of education is the sum of the private marginal benefit of education
ye and the social benefit of education Ē [yE ]. Hence, the first-best amount of education should
equate the marginal benefit of education to its marginal cost k. Thus, the first-best profile
of education is implicitly determined by the equation:13



k = ye θ, e∗ (θ, Y ) ; Ē [e∗ ] + Ē yE θ, e∗ (θ, Y ) , Ē [e∗ ] .
Since efficiency requires that marginal productivity of education must be equalized for all
individuals, the amount of education received by an individual should depend only on her
ability. Therefore, the first-best amount of education is independent of the parent’s wealth
Y (we shall denote e∗ (θ, Y ) as e∗ (θ) in order to emphasize that it does not depend on Y ).
Moreover, since c∗ is independent of Y , the optimal level of consumption is also independent
of wealth.
Furthermore, as long as there are enough resources so that e∗ and c∗ are feasible, any
profile of bequests yields the same welfare (since the utility function is linear in bequests
and the welfare function is utilitarianist). Thus, an optimal profile of bequests consists
of the amount of resources left to the household after the expenditures in education and
consumption:
t∗ (θ, Y ) = Y − ke∗ (θ) − c∗ .
(9)
As can be seen from the equation above, the marginal propensity to bequeath under this
policy is equal to one.
We will assume that resources are sufficiently high so that e∗ and c∗ are feasible. If
this assumption is not satisfied, it would be socially optimal for all individuals to leave zero
bequests.
Assumption 1 Ē [t∗ ] ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 The first-best allocations are
{c∗ , e∗ (θ) , t∗ (θ, Y ) ; θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} .
13

The proofs of existence and uniqueness of the solutions obtained in this paper are presented in the
appendix.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Because marginal productivity of education is increasing in ability, it follows that education provided in the first-best solution is also increasing in ability (i.e., the first-best
equilibrium is input-regressive).14
Remark 1 When yE > 0, even parents who are not credit constrained provide an inefficiently low amount of education in the equilibrium without government intervention due to
the presence of positive externalities.

3.2

The Second-Best Solution

Substituting the household’s budget constraint (4) in the utility function, it can be written
as
U (θ, Y ) = u (Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y )) + y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) − m (θ, Y ) .
(10)
The following lemma, whose proof can be found at DF, allows us to substitute the incentivecompatibility constraint for the local first- and second-order conditions of the incentivecompatibility program:
Lemma 1 A C 2 by parts policy {τ (Y ) , f (θ, Y ) , m (θ, Y ) , e (θ, Y ) ; θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} is
incentive-compatible if, and only if, it satisfies
∂U (θ, Y )
= yθ (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) ,
∂θ

(11)

∂e (θ, Y )
≥ 0,
∂θ

(12)

for all θ, Y.
The proposition below states that the government is able to implement the efficient level of
education and consumption in an economy with private information and where an individual
may choose not to join the public education system. Moreover, since this implementation
does not require any additional resources, it achieves first-best welfare.
Proposition 2 The optimal educational policy implements the first-best amount of education and consumption {e∗ (θ) , c∗ ; θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} and achieves the first-best welfare.
Furthermore, the optimal profile of deferred payments is such that m∗ (θ, Y ) = −t∗ (θ, Y ) ,
where t∗ is as defined in equation (9).
Proof. See Appendix.
The basic intuition behind this result is that when the government raises the income
tax uniformly and decreases the up-front fee in the same amount, the indirect utility of
an individual participating in the proposed scheme remains constant, whereas the indirect
utility of an individual who purchases education privately decreases. Hence, the participation
14

Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain

9

∂e∗ (θ)
∂θ

= − yyeθ
> 0.
ee

constraint (8) can be implemented at no cost. Moreover, since the utility function is quasilinear and the social welfare function is utilitarianist, any redistribution of wealth does not
change welfare.15
Proposition 2 implies that when we consider budget constraint (5), a strictly higher welfare
is achieved (since first-best is implemented). Moreover, contrary to the results of DF, the
optimal policy provides equality of opportunities in education (since e∗ (θ) does not depend
on Y ).16
Although Proposition 2 states that the first-best can be achieved, it does not show how.
In the next subsection, we address the implementation of the optimal policy. It is shown
that the first-best can be obtained through Pigouvian taxes and public provision of credit.
Moreover, it does not require that the government observes wealth so that our results also
hold in an environment where Y is unobservable.

3.3

Implementation through Pigouvian taxes

In this subsection, we will restrict the space of contracts to those consisting of lump-sum taxes,
a linear up-front fee, and a deferred payment. Formally, let τ (Y ) , f (θ, Y ) and m (θ, Y ) be
the income tax, up-front fee and deferred payments as defined in the last section. Define
t (θ, Y ) and k̂ (θ, Y ) as
t (θ, Y ) = −m (θ, Y ) ,
f (θ, Y ) + m (θ, Y )
k̂ (θ, Y ) =
.
e (θ, Y )
In general, k̂ and t could depend on θ and Y . However, as we show below, they are both
constant for all θ and Y under the optimal policy. Hence, an optimal contract consists of a
lump-sum tax τ , a linear up-front fee t (θ, Y ) + k̂e (θ, Y ) , and a deferred payment −t (θ, Y )
(which is a subset of the class of contracts considered previously). This mechanism can be
alternatively interpreted as a lump-sum tax τ , a loan −t (θ, Y ) and an up-front fee k̂e (θ, Y ).
Substituting the definitions of k̂ and t in the government budget constraint (5), it can be
written as
h

i
Ē k − k̂ e − τ ≤ 0.
(13)
In each period, the government pays (k− k̂) as a subsidy on each unit of education and receives
τ as a lump-sum tax. The government also loans Ē [−t] in the first period and receives it in
15

In that sense, the model is similar to the regulation model when the shadow-cost of public funds is zero.
However, unlike in the standard regulation models [e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993)], the shadow-cost of public
funds is endogenous in this model. In DF, it is only zero in the extreme case where the government is able
to circumvent the restriction that deferred payments cannot be used to finance education and income taxes
(Proposition 6). As Proposition 2 shows, the first best is implementable even when the extreme assumptions
of DF are not satisfied if deferred payments can be used to finance education.
16
Notice also that the second-best education profile is strictly greater than the one obtained in a competitive
equilibrium (see Remark 1).
Proposition 2 can be generalized to the case where the returns to education are random so that default
may emerge [see Gottlieb and Moreira (2003)]. The intuition for this result is that quasi-linearity implies that
individuals are risk-neutral with respect to bequests. Then, they are indifferent between lotteries with high
deferred payments only when outcomes are good and fixed payments with the same expected value. Thus, the
optimal policy is determined ex-ante but not ex-post and the first-best welfare can be implemented through
income contingent payments.
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the next period. Since the market interest rate is normalized to 1, Ē [−t] may take any value
because it is always repaid in the following period. In a steady-state, repayments are equal
to loans in each period. Thus, as usual, the budget constraint simply states that the total
expenses should not exceed the total revenues of the government.
Substituting the definitions of k̂ and t in the parent’s budget constraint (4), it follows that
the total amount of consumption, loans repaid, and taxes must be equal to the household’s
wealth:
Y = c (θ, Y ) + t (θ, Y ) + τ + k̂e (θ, Y ) .
(14)
Hence, we can write the parent’s problem as:

max



u Y − t (θ, Y ) − τ − k̂e (θ, Y ) + y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) + t (θ, Y )

e(θ,Y ),t(θ,Y )

subject to E = Ē [e] .
As there are no restrictions on t, the solution must be such that the marginal utility of
consumption is equal to the marginal utility of wealth left to the child. Hence, each parent
must be consuming c∗ . Moreover, the private marginal benefit of education ye must be equal
to its marginal cost k̂. Therefore, we get the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The solution to the parent’s problem is {cP (θ, Y ) , eP (θ, Y ) , tP (θ, Y ) ; θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈
Γ}, such that:
cP (θ, Y ) = c∗ ,

k̂ = ye θ, eP (θ, Y ) ; E ,
(15)
tP (θ, Y ) = Y − c∗ − τ − k̂eP (θ, Y ) .
Proof. The result follows from the first-order conditions (which are necessary and sufficient).
Now, we are ready to show that the first-best welfare can be reached through a suitable
choice of τ and k̂. The price of education k̂ is chosen in order to internalize for the educational
externalities. Hence, it must be equal to the private cost of education k minus the educational
externalities Ē [yE ] . The lump-sum tax is set in order to cover
 P the expenses from the subsidies.
Therefore, it must be equal to the average subsidy Ē e Ē [yE ]. Substituting into the
parent’s problem, we get the following result:
Proposition 3 There exists a second-best solution where the price of education k̂ and the
tax τ are both constant in θ and Y . Moreover, this solution achieves the first-best welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that the optimal policy can be implemented with a lump-sum tax τ , a constant
price of education k̂ and a constant interest rate implies that it can also be implemented
when household’s wealth is unobservable.
Define the household’s financial contribution as
z (θ, Y ) ≡ τ + k̂e∗ (θ) .
11

As education is independent of wealth, it is clear that an individual’s financial contribution is
independent of her income. Moreover, z (θ, Y ) is strictly increasing in ability since k̂ > 0 and
ė∗ (θ) > 0. Therefore, households with brighter children contribute more than households
with less bright children. These results differ from DF, where households with higher incomes contribute less than those with lower incomes and households with less bright children
contribute more than those with brighter children.
Let xP denote the wealth left to the child:
xP (θ, Y ) ≡ y (θ, e∗ (θ) ; E) + tP (θ, Y ) .
Then, it follows that the marginal propensity to bequeath under the Pigouvian scheme is
P
equal to one (i.e., ∂x
∂Y = 1). In other words, every additional amount of wealth is left to the
future generation. Furthermore, individuals with higher ability receive more wealth through
P
education than ones with less ability (since ∂x
∂θ = yθ > 0).
Therefore, the optimal educational policy generates large inequalities of wealth left to
the future generation. The quasi-linearity of the utility function implies that welfare is not
affected by this inequality. In the next section, we study how the results change when the
utility function is not quasi-linear so that individuals care not only about redistribution of
present consumption but also about redistribution of wealth left for future generations.

4

Strictly Concave Utility

In the previous Section, we have followed DF in assuming that parents’ preferences can be
represented by a utility function linear in the wealth left to their children. This assumption
implies that a utilitarian government does not have preferences for redistribution of bequests.
Then, as was shown in Subsection 3.3, the optimal policy implements first-best welfare but
generates large inequalities of wealth left to the future generation.
In this section, we assume that the parents’ utility function is strictly concave in their
children’s wealth:
v 00 (x) < 0, u00 (x) < 0.
This assumption implies that parents are risk-averse in the wealth of their children and a
utilitarian government has preference for redistribution. We also assume that v satisfies the
Inada condition limx→0 v 0 (x) = +∞.
Substituting the household’s budget constraint (4) in the utility function, we obtain
U = u (Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y )) + v(y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) − m (θ, Y )).
Then, it follows that
Ueθ = v 0 (y − m) [yeθ − rA (v, y − m) ye yθ ] ,
00

(x)
where rA (v, x) ≡ − vv0 (x)
is the absolute coefficient of risk-aversion and measures the concavity
of v.
The sign of Ueθ is ambiguous since an increasing profile of education has two opposite
effects in the parent’s utility. The first effect (yeθ > 0) concerns efficiency: an increasing
profile of education benefits more those with higher marginal productivity of education. The
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second effect (−rA ye yθ < 0) concerns equity: an increasing profile of education gives more
wealth to those with lower marginal utility. Then, the sign of Ueθ will depend on the preference
for redistribution relative to efficiency (captured by the risk-aversion coefficient rA ).17
The following lemma presents the standard necessary (second-order) condition for incentivecompatibility.
Lemma 3 An incentive-compatible C 2 by parts policy {τ (Y ) , f (θ, Y ) , m (θ, Y ) , e (θ, Y ) ;
θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] , Y ∈ Γ} satisfies
∂e (θ, Y )
Ueθ
≥ 0,
∂θ
for all θ, Y.
Proof. Omitted.
Thus, incentive-compatible policies are generally not input-regressive. When the preference for redistribution is sufficiently small, incentive-compatible policies are input-regressive
)
> 0) as in the quasi-linear environment. If the concern for redistribution is suffi( ∂e(θ,Y
∂θ
ciently high, input-regressive policies are no longer incentive-compatible. Indeed, incentivecompatible educational policies may also be non-monotonic.
For example, suppose that parents have constant risk-aversion with respect to wealth left
to their children rA > 0. Then, any incentive-compatible education profile must be increasing
if yyeeθyθ ≥ rA and decreasing if yyeeθyθ ≤ rA . Figure 1 shows incentive-compatible profiles when




yeθ
yeθ
d
d
18
dθ ye yθ > 0 and dθ ye yθ < 0, respectively.

Figure 1: Incentive-compatible profiles of education
In any of those cases, however, a government that does not observe ability cannot implement the first-best. The strict concavity of the utility function introduces a trade-off between
17

The preference for redistribution of bequests is absent in DF since rA is zero when the utility function is
quasi-linear.
18
When Ueθ does not have a constant sign, the single-crossing property does not hold. Araujo and Moreira
(2004) and Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira (2008) present a method for solving screening models where the
single-crossing property does not hold.
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efficiency and equity. The policy from Section 3, which implements the efficient amount of
education but generates a large inequality of bequests is no longer desirable.
The trade-off between efficiency and equity implies that optimal policies would typically
be distorted towards more progressive policies as in standard optimal taxation models [e.g.
Mirrlees (1971)]. Indeed, starting from an undistorted economy (i.e. an economy with Pigouvian taxes and credit provision), a local increase in the progressivity of education is always
welfare increasing. This follows from the well-known fact that, in a previously undistorted
economy, distortions cause second-order losses and first-order gains in welfare (when the
government cares about redistribution).
Proposition 4 When v is strictly concave, the first-best amount of welfare cannot be reached
when the government does not observe the ability to benefit from education θ. Moreover,
starting from an undistorted economy, a local increase in the progressivity of education is
strictly welfare enhancing.
Proof. See Appendix.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown that the regressivity results obtained by DF are driven by
the assumptions that the government is not allowed to use deferred payments in education,
and that a utilitarian government maximizes quasi-linear utility functions (which implies
that it minimizes deadweight loss). Then, the government’s problem is to minimize the
inefficiency caused by this nonstandard restriction on its budget constraint. When we allow
the government to use deferred payments to finance education, the optimal educational policy
achieves the same amount of welfare that could be reached if ability were observable.
By not internalizing the effects that education causes on the rest of the economy, the
amount of education that each household provides in the equilibrium without government
intervention is inefficiently low. We show that the first-best solution can be implemented
through Pigouvian taxes and credit provision when neither ability nor wealth are observable. In this context, the appropriate Pigouvian taxes are educational subsidies that induce
households to internalize for the (positive) externalities caused by education.
As first-best efficiency requires that marginal productivity of education be equalized across
individuals, it follows that the amount of education received by a child does not dependent on
his/her parent’s wealth. Therefore, the optimal policy provides equality of opportunities in
education. Furthermore, since the optimal amount of financial contribution does not depend
on parental income and is increasing in the ability of the child, the optimal educational policy
is not regressive.
When utility functions are strictly concave so that individuals care not only about redistribution of present consumption but also about redistribution of wealth left for future
generations, input-regressive policies may not be incentive-compatible. The trade-off between efficiency and equity implies that the first-best welfare can no longer be achieved.
Moreover, starting from an undistorted economy, increases in the progressivity of education
are locally welfare increasing.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Introducing the auxiliary variable S (θ), equation (3) can be rewritten as
Z
Ṡ (θ) =
e (θ, Y ) φ (θ) h (Y ) dY, S (θ0 ) = 0, S (θ1 ) = E.
Y ∈Γ

Substituting the resource constraint in the objective function, we can write the following Hamiltonian:
H

=

[u (c (θ, Y )) + y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) + Y − c (θ, Y ) − ke (θ, Y )] φ (θ) h (Y )
Z
+µ (θ)
e (θ, Y ) φ (θ) h (Y ) dY,
Y ∈Γ

where c and e are control variables and S is a state variable. The first-order conditions are
u0 (c (θ, Y )) = 1,

ye (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) − k = µ (θ) ,

Let W be the welfare function. Then, as

∂W
∂E e=e∗ ,E=E ∗

and

µ (θ) = µ constant.

= µ (θ1 ) = µ, it follows that

Ē [yE (θ, e; E)] = µ.
Substituting in the first-order conditions, concludes to proof.



Proof of Proposition 2: Substituting the government’s budget constraint (5) into the objective
function, we obtain:
W = Ē [u (Y − τ − f ) + y (θ, e; E) + τ + f − ke] .
Using equation (10), we can rewrite the objective function as:
W = Ē [U − m + τ + f − ke] .
As in the proof of Proposition 1, rewrite equation (3) using the auxiliary variable S (θ) as:
Z
Ṡ (θ) =
e (θ, Y ) φ (θ) h (Y ) dY, S (θ0 ) = 0, S (θ1 ) = E.

(16)

Y ∈Γ

For the moment, we will ignore the monotonicity condition (12). Latter, we will verify that it is
satisfied in the solution of this relaxed program. Then, we can set up the following Hamiltonian:
H

=

[U (θ, Y ) + m (θ, Y ) + τ (Y ) + f (θ, Y ) − ke (θ, Y )] h (Y ) φ (θ)
Z
+ρ (θ)
e (θ, Y ) h (Y ) φ (θ) dY + γ (θ, Y ) yθ (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E)
Y ∈Γ

+λ (θ, Y ) [u (Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y )) + y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) − m (θ, Y ) − U (θ, Y )]
+µ (θ, Y ) [U (θ, Y ) − P (θ, Y − τ (Y ) , E)]
The control variables are m, f , τ , and e and the state variables are U and S. ρ (θ) , γ (θ, Y ) ,
λ (θ, Y ) , and µ (θ, Y ) are the multipliers associated with (16), (11), (10), and (8), respectively.
The first-order conditions are:19
∂H
= 0 ∴ λ (θ, Y ) = h (Y ) φ (θ) ,
∂m (θ, Y )
19

We omit the dependence of y on θ, e (θ, Y ), and E for notational clarity.
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∂H
= 0 ∴ Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y ) = c∗ ,
∂f (θ, Y )

(17)

∂H
= 0 ∴ µ (θ, Y ) PY (θ, Y − τ (Y ) , E) = 0 ∴ µ (θ, Y ) = 0,
∂τ (Y )
∂H
= 0 ∴ [ρ (θ) − k] h (Y ) φ (θ) + γ (θ, Y ) yθe + λ (θ, Y ) ye = 0,
∂e (θ, Y )

(18)

∂H
∂γ (θ, Y )
=−
∴ γ (θ, Y ) constant in θ,
∂U (θ, Y )
∂θ

(19)

∂H
= −ρ̇ (θ) ∴ ρ (θ) = ρ constant in θ, and
∂S (θ)
0 = min {µ (θ, Y ) ; U (θ, Y ) − P (θ, Y − τ (Y ) , E)} .

(20)

From equation (17), it follows that the consumption that solves the program above is equal to
the first-best level of consumption c∗ . Since U (θ1 , Y ) is free for all Y, the transversality condition for
γ (θ, Y ) is γ (θ1 , Y ) = 0. Therefore, equation (19) yields
γ (θ, Y ) = 0, for almost all θ, Y.
Substituting into equation (18), we obtain
ye (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) = k − ρ.

(21)

Next, we will show that the amount of education solving the relaxed program above is the same as
in the first-best solution. In order to do so, let er and E r be the amounts of education and externalities
that solve the relaxed problem. By the envelope theorem, ∂W
∂E e=er ,E=E r = ρ. Therefore,
Z

θ1

θ0

Z

yE (θ, er (θ, Y ) ; E r ) h (Y ) φ (θ) dY dθ = ρ.

Y ∈Γ

Substituting in equation (21), we obtain


ye (θ, er (θ, Y ) ; E) + Ē yE (θ, er , Ē [er ] = k,
which is the equation that implicitly defines e∗ .
Note that P (θ, 0, E) = 0 and PY (θ, Y, E) ≥ 1. Moreover, a unitary increase in τ (Y ) and a unitary
decrease in f (θ, Y ) leaves U (θ, Y ) unchanged. Hence, it is always possible to choose τ (Y ) and f (θ, Y )
such that condition (20) is satisfied.
We have shown that the profiles of education and consumption solving the relaxed problem are the
same as the first-best solution. Since the utility functions are linear in deferred payments m (θ, Y ) , it
follows that any profile of deferred payments such that the government’s budget constraint is satisfied
as an equality achieves the same welfare W. Fix τ (Y ) and f (θ, Y ) so that equation (20) is satisfied
and let mr (θ, Y ) be given by
mr (θ, Y ) = ke∗ (θ) + c∗ − Y.
Then, substituting equation (17), we obtain
mr (θ, Y ) = ke∗ (θ) − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y ) .
Taking the expectation of the equation above, we get
Ē [mr ] = Ē [ke∗ − τ − f ] ,
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which is the government’s budget constraint (equation 5). Therefore, the first-best welfare is reached
in the relaxed program.
It remains to be shown that the monotonicity condition (12) is satisfied in the solution of the
relaxed program. But, since e∗ (θ) is increasing in θ, it follows that this condition is satisfied and,
therefore, the relaxed solution also solves the second-best problem.

Proof of Proposition 3: Set k̂ as


k̂ = k − Ē yE (θ, e∗ , Ē [e∗ ]) .

(22)

Substituting in the first-order conditions of the household’s problem (15), we obtain eP (θ, Y ) =
e (θ).
Set τ as


τ = Ē [e∗ ] Ē yE (θ, e∗ , Ē [e∗ ]) .
(23)
∗

Then, it follows that
h
i
 
Ē tP = Ē Y − k̂e∗ − c∗ − τ = Ē [Y − ke∗ − c∗ ] = Ē [t∗ ] .
Hence, as c∗ , e∗ (θ), and Ē [t∗ ] are the same as in the first-best solution (and utility is linear in t),
first-best welfare is achieved. From equation (22), we have




k − k̂ e∗ (θ) = Ē yE (θ, e∗ , Ē [e∗ ]) e∗ (θ) .
Applying Ē to both sides of the above expression, yields
h
 i


Ē k − k̂ e∗ = Ē yE (θ, e∗ , Ē [e∗ ]) Ē [e∗ ] .
Hence, equations (23) and (24) imply that Ē
constraint (13) is satisfied.

h

(24)


i
k − k̂ e∗ − τ = 0 so that the government’s budget



Proof of Proposition 4: Using equation (1), the first-best problem can be written as
Z

θ1

Z

max

{c(θ,Y ),e(θ,Y ),x(θ,Y ),E}

Z

[u (c (θ, Y )) + v (x (θ, Y ))] h (Y ) φ (θ) dY dθ
θ0

Y ∈Γ

subject to (3) , and
Z
[Y − c (θ, Y ) − ke (θ, Y ) − x (θ, Y ) + y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E)] h (Y ) φ (θ) dY dθ ≥ 0.

θ1

θ0

Y ∈Γ

Introducing the auxiliary variable S (θ) , we can write the following Hamiltonian:
Z
H = [u (c (θ, Y )) + v (x (θ, Y ))] h (Y ) φ (θ) + ρ (θ)
e (θ, Y ) h (Y ) φ (θ) dY
Y ∈Γ

Z

θ1

Z
[Y − c (θ, Y ) − ke (θ, Y ) − x (θ, Y ) + y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E)] h (Y ) φ (θ) dY dθ.

+λ
θ0

Y ∈Γ

The control variables are c, e, and x, whereas the state variable is E. The first order conditions with
respect to c and x yield
u0 (c (θ, Y )) = v 0 (x (θ, Y )) = λ.
Therefore, c (θ, Y ) and x (θ, Y ) are constant for almost all θ, Y .
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We claim that
c (θ, Y ) and x (θ, Y ) constant is not incentive-compatible. Let θ̂ > θ and
 having

suppose that x θ̂, Y = x (θ, Y ) and c θ̂, Y = c (θ, Y ) . Then, from equation (1), we must have


 


y θ̂, e θ̂, Y ; E + m θ̂, Y = y (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) + m (θ, Y ) .
Since θ̂ > θ, it follows that


 




y θ̂, e θ̂, Y ; E + m θ̂, Y < y θ̂, e (θ, Y ) ; E + m (θ, Y ) .
If type θ̂ takes the contract designed for type θ, she obtains utility:
 


u (Y − τ (Y ) − f (θ, Y )) + v y θ̂, e (θ) ; E + m (θ, Y )



 


= u Y − τ (Y ) − f θ̂, Y
+ v y θ̂, e (θ) ; E + m (θ, Y )



 
  


> u Y − τ (Y ) − f θ̂, Y
+ v y θ̂, e θ̂ ; E + m θ̂, Y
,


where the equality above uses the fact that c (θ, Y ) = c θ̂, Y and the inequality uses the fact that
yθ > 0. Therefore, θ̂ can benefit from taking the contract designed for type θ, which violates the
incentive-compatibility constraint (7). Hence, the first-best level of welfare cannot be reached when
ability is not observable if v is strictly concave. This concludes the first part of the proof.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, taking that the first order conditions of the Hamiltonian with
respect to e and E and using the envelope theorem, it follows that the first-best education profile is
implicitly determined by:
ye (θ, e (θ, Y ) ; E) + Ē [yE ] = k
In order to establish the second part of the proposition, notice that the derivative of the welfare
function with respect to e (θ, Y ) evaluated at the first-best education profile is
∂W
∂e (θ, Y )

= h (Y ) φ (θ) [v 0 (x∗ (θ, Y )) ye (θ, e∗ (θ) ; E) − k] ,
e∗ ,c∗ ,t∗

where x∗ (θ, Y ) = y (θ, e∗ (θ) ; E) + Y − ke∗ (θ) − c∗ . The sign of the derivative above is the same as
the sign of v 0 (x∗ (θ, Y )) ye (θ, e∗ (θ) ; E) − k, which is decreasing in Y . Recall that, since wealth is
observable, there is no incentive-compatibility constraint associated with Y . Therefore, starting from
an undistorted education profile, a local increase in progressivity of education increases welfare.


Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions
The following proposition ensures that the education profiles in the competitive equilibrium without government intervention (defined in Subsection 2.2) are well defined:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the utility function satisfies the assumptions of either Section 3 or Section 4. The competitive equilibrium without government exists and is unique.
Proof. First, consider the quasi-linear case. It suffices to show that there exist unique eu and ec such
that k = ye (θ, eu ; E) , ku0 (Y − kec ) = ye (θ, ec ; E) .
Define ξ : R+ → R+ as ξ (e) ≡ ye (θ, e; E). Then, since ξ is continuous, lim ξ (e) = +∞ and
e→0

lim ξ (e) = 0, it follows that there exists eu such that ξ (eu ) = k. Moreover, as ξ 0 (e) = yee (θ, e; E) <

e→+∞
u

0, e is unique.
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Analogously define ϕ : R+ → R as ϕ (e) ≡ ye (θ, e; E) − ku0 (Y − ke). As Y > 0, it follows that
lim ϕ (e) = +∞. Then, as ϕ is continuous and lim ϕ (e) = −∞, it follows that there exists ec such

e→0

e→ Yk

0

that ϕ (e ) = 0. Furthermore, as ϕ (e) = yee (θ, e; E) + k 2 u00 (Y − ke) < 0, ec is unique.
Now, consider the strictly concave case. The parent’s program can be written as
c

max u(Y − ke − t) + v (y (θ, e; E) + t) .
t,e

Existence and uniqueness follow immediately from strict concavity and the Inada conditions.
The same argument establishes the existence of equilibrium with Pigouvian taxes and credit
provision in Subsection 3.3:
Corollary 1 There exists a unique equilibrium to the decentralized implementation defined in Subsection 3.3.

The following proposition ensures the existence and uniqueness of the first-best level of education
in both the quasilinear and strictly concave economies (which is also the second-best level of education
in the quasilinear economy).20
Proposition 6 There exists a unique e∗ such that



k = ye θ, e∗ (θ, Y ) ; Ē [e∗ ] + Ē yE θ, e∗ (θ, Y ) , Ē [e∗ ] .

(25)

∗
Proof. Notice
 that if e exists, it must be constant in Y. Fix an arbitrary θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ] and denote
e (−θ) as {e θ̂ ; θ̂ 6= θ}.
Define the function ρ as

ρ (e (θ) , e (−θ) , E) ≡ ye (θ, e (θ) ; E) + Ē [yE (θ, e (−θ) , E)] − k.
Then, as lim ρ (e, e (−θ) , E) = +∞,
e→0

lim ρ (e, e (−θ) , E) < 0 (by lime→∞ ye (e, θ; E) = 0 and

e→+∞

(A6)) and ρ is continuous, it follows that, for every e (−θ) and every E, there exists ẽ (θ) such that
ρ (ẽ (θ) , e (−θ) , E) = 0. Moreover, the Inada conditions imply that this ẽ (θ) is unique.
Since lim ρ (e, e (−θ) , E) < 0 and ρ is continuous, there exists ē such that, for all e > ē,
e→+∞

ρ (e, e (−θ) , E) < 0.
Define  and P as  ≡ [0, ē] and P ≡ {{e (θ)}θ∈[θ0 ,θ1 ] }. Then, F ≡ {(E, e) ∈  × P ; E =
R θ1
e (θ) φ (θ) dθ} is a compact, convex set in the product topology.
θ0


Define the function T : F → F as T (E, e) = Ẽ, ẽ , where ẽ ≡ {ẽ (θ) : θ ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ]} and
Rθ
Ẽ ≡ θ01 ẽ (θ) φ (θ) dθ (from the definition of ē, it follows that Ẽ ∈ P ).


Then, the Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem implies the existence of a fixed point of T, Ê, ê (see,
Dunford and Schwartz, 1988, p. 456). From the definition of T , this fixed point must satisfy equation
Rθ
(25) and Ê = θ01 ê (θ) φ (θ) dθ.
Uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of the first-best problem with respect to e.
20
The first-best allocations in the quasilinear economy are not unique since the welfare function is indifferent
with respect to any distribution of bequests.

19

References
[1] Araujo, A., Gottlieb, D. and Moreira, H. (2008). “Multidimensional Incentive-Compatibility:
The Multiplicatively Separable Case”, Mimeo., MIT.
[2] Araujo, A. and Moreira, H. (2004). “Adverse Selection Problems without the Spence-Mirrlees
Condition”, Discussion Paper no. 425, Getulio Vargas Foundation.
[3] Bommier, A., Lee, R., Miller, T., and Zuber, S. (2004). “Who Wins and Who Loses? Public
Transfer Accounts for US Generations Born 1850 to 2090”, Working Paper no. 10969, NBER.
[4] De Fraja, G. (2002). “The Design of Optimal Education Policies”, Review of Economic Studies,
69, 437-466.
[5] Dunford, N. and Schwartz, J. T. (1988). Linear Operators, Part I: General Theory (New York:
John Wiley and Sons).
[6] Fernandez, R. and Rogerson, R. (1996). “Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of
Public Education”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 135-164.
[7] Fernandez, R. and Rogerson, R. (1998). “Public Education and Income Distribution: A Dynamic
Quantitative Evaluation of Education-Finance Reform”, American Economic Review, 88, 813833.
[8] Fleurbaey, M., Gary-Bobo, R.J., and Maguain, D. (2002). “Education, distributive justice, and
adverse selection”, Journal of Public Economics, 84, 113-150.
[9] Gottlieb, D. and Moreira, H. (2003). “Should Educational Policies be Regressive”, Discussion
Paper no. 508, Getulio Vargas Foundation.
[10] Hare, P. G. and Ulph, D. T. (1979). “On Education and Distribution”, Journal of Political
Economy, 87, 193-212.
[11] Kozol, J. (1991). Savage Inequalities (New York: Crown Publishers).
[12] Laffont, J. J., and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
(Cambridge: MIT Press).
[13] Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation”, Review of
Economic Studies, 38, 175-208.
[14] Psacharopoulos, G. (1986). Financing Education in Developing Countries (Washington D.C.:
World Bank).

20

